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Abstract 
The aim of this paper is to analyse the effect of financial development and banking 
competition on economic growth using both structural measures of competition (market 
concentration) and measures based on the new empirical industrial organization 
perspective (Panzar and Rosse`s test and the Lerner index). The evidence obtained in 
the period 1993-2003 for a sample of 53 sectors in 21 countries indicates that financial 
development and the exercise of bank market power promote economic growth. The 
latter result is consistent with the literature on relationship lending which argues that 
bank competition can have a negative effect on the availability of finance for companies 
that are informationally more opaque. The results cast doubt on the use of market 
concentration measures as indicators of competition. 
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1. Introduction* 
 
The empirical evidence available (King and Levine, 1993a and b; Levine and 
Zervos, 1998; Guiso, Jappelli, Padula and Pagano, 2004; Levine, 2005; Loayza and 
Rancière, 2006; among others) permits us to state that the development of financial 
markets in general, and of banking markets in particular, plays an important role in the 
explanation of economic growth. This result is not surprising if we take into account 
that the sources of economic growth are both productivity gains and capital 
accumulation, the financial sector being the mechanism through which savings are 
channelled into investment either directly (in the markets) or indirectly (via financial 
intermediaries). 
 
However, Rajan and Zingales (1998) note that the positive correlation habitually 
found between financial development and economic growth may be due to a problem of 
omitted variable. Given that financial development depends on the capacity of 
economies to save and, according to the principal theories of growth, the saving rate is 
principal determinant of economic growth, the observation of a positive relation in 
cross-country regressions, or in time series for one country, may be no more than the 
reflection of the relationship of both variables (economic growth and financial 
development) with the saving rate. It is therefore necessary to identify the mechanism 
through which financial development enhances long term economic growth. 
 
With this objective of making explicit the mechanisms through which financial 
development favours economic growth, Rajan and Zingales (1998) explore the capacity 
of the financial sector to provide lendable funds to the different sectors of the economy 
according to their external financial dependence. A large part of the theoretical research 
establishes that the financial markets and banking institutions help to solve the problems 
of adverse selection and moral hazard, thus reducing the cost of finance. In this way, 
financial development should help those firms or sectors where the problems of moral 
hazard and asymmetrical information are present to obtain funds. Thus, Rajan and 
Zingales (1998) propose a test to verify this hypothesis, assuming that the sectors most 
dependent on external financing will grow faster the more developed are the financial 
markets to which they have access. In the test, therefore, we analyse whether ex-ante 
financial development facilitates access to financing, and therefore enhances ex-post 
growth in the more financially dependent sectors. This approach has the advantage of 
making explicit one of the mechanisms by which the financial sector affects growth, 
                                                 
* The authors acknowledge the financial support of the Spanish Savings Banks Foundation (Funcas). The 
paper is developed within the framework of the research programs of the Ministry of Science and 
Technology-FEDER (SEJ2004-00110 and SEJ2005-02776). 
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providing a robust test of causality by correcting for country and industry 
characteristics. The test is thus not so dependent on the macroeconomic modelling 
habitual in the literature on economic growth, which consists of explaining economic 
growth by proxies of financial development (such as the importance of bank credit 
and/or stock market capitalisation relative to GDP).  
 
As well as the importance of financial development, another subject of interest 
that has received much less attention is the influence of the degree of banking 
competition on economic growth. From a theoretical point of view, the literature on the 
subject shows ambiguous effects. Thus on the one hand the conventional economic 
theory teaches us that exercise of market power leads to an equilibrium solution 
characterised by a higher rate of interest and a lower quantity of financing than in a 
situation of perfect competition. In consequence, the social inefficiency of monopoly 
translates into the financing of a smaller number of investment projects, and therefore 
into lower economic growth. Thus, given investment opportunities in a country and in a 
particular sector, the fact that the banking sector enjoys market power will reduce the 
incentives to invest in the most financially dependent sectors, therefore reducing their 
potential growth. 
 
However, although market power can imply higher costs of financing, in the 
literature there is no consensus as to its effects on the supply of lendable funds. Thus it 
is usually said that where market power exists, banks may have more incentive to invest 
in the acquisition of soft information by establishing close relationships with borrowers 
over time (relationship banking), facilitating the availability of credit and consequently 
reducing firms’ financial constraints (Dell´Ariccia and Marquez, 2004). In this scenario, 
the banks can make their investments in relationships with clients profitable in the long 
term as a consequence of the existence of an information monopoly (Rajan, 1992; 
Petersen and Rajan, 1995). Furthermore, as argued by Boot (2000), even though a firm 
runs the risk of paying higher interest rates in a context of non-competitive banking 
markets, the firm can benefit from a greater availability of finance. Nevertheless, there 
is also the threat of being “locked in” (hold-up problem) as a consequence of the 
information monopoly. To sum up, therefore, the effect of market power on the 
conditions of finance is a matter to be settled with empirical evidence. 
 
Despite the abundant literature devoted to quantifying market power, there are 
hardly any studies that explore the relationship between banking competition and 
economic growth. The only exceptions are the studies by Cetorelli and Gamberra (2001) 
and Claessens and Laeven (2005). In the first case, they analyse empirically the effect of 
the concentration of banking markets on the economic growth of sectors in the 1980s, 
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using information on 41 countries and 36 manufacturing sectors. Their results indicate 
that banking concentration promotes the growth of the youngest firms in the sectors 
most dependent on external finance, facilitating access to credit for the youngest firms. 
However, the authors find a negative general effect of concentration on growth which 
affects all sectors and firms indiscriminately. Therefore, if we accept the use of market 
concentration as a measure of competition, greater market power would favour the 
economic growth of the youngest firms, precisely those in which asymmetries of 
information and uncertainty are most intense. It is in this group of firms, therefore, 
where the soft and informal information that credit institutions can acquire through 
informal client relationships acquires its greatest value. 
 
Given the limitations presented by the use of market concentration indicators as 
measures of competition, Claessens and Laeven (2005) analyse the effect of banking 
competition on economic growth using an indicator of market power based on the 
theory of industrial organisation: the H statistic of Panzar and Rosse. Their results show 
that the industries most dependent on bank financing grow faster in the countries with 
stiffer banking competition, so they reject the hypothesis that market power can favour 
access to finance. Furthermore, since the results are not maintained when measures of 
concentration are used as a proxy for competition, the validity of studies that use 
concentration as a measure of market power is called into question. 
 
Since the theory offers ambiguous results about the effect of banking 
competition on economic growth, it is necessary to have available more empirical 
evidence on this matter, especially in view of the shortage of studies hitherto. Also, the 
need for additional evidence is in this case even more important if we take into account 
that the only two existing studies use exactly the same sample, countries, sectors and 
variables, so there is a need for evidence obtained from new samples to be able to test 
the robustness of the results obtained so far. 
 
In this context, this study makes the following contributions. First, as well as the 
H-statistic used by Claessens and Leaven (2005), we use the Lerner index of market 
power. This index presents the advantage that it can be calculated annually, enabling us 
to test more accurately the effect of the initial level of competition on economic growth 
and not only the effect of the average levels. It will furthermore allow us to test the 
robustness of the results obtained using different indicators of banking competition. 
Second, while Claessens and Leaven (2005) use the indicator of financial dependence 
constructed by Rajan and Zingales (1998) for the period 1980-1989 to analyse the 
effects on growth in those years (or alternatively 1980-1997), in our case we calculate 
indicators of external financial dependence for a more recent period (1993-2003). Also, 
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the indicators of competition are calculated for the same years for which observations of 
the degree of financial dependence are available. Third, the sample covers a wider range 
of sectors, as both Rajan and Zingales (1998) and Claessens and Leaven (2005) studied 
only the manufacturing sector.  
 
In line with previous studies, the results obtained indicate that financial 
development promotes economic growth. The results also show that the banks’ exercise 
of market power, proxied by indicators from the literature on industrial organisation, 
promotes economic growth. This last result is consistent with the literature on 
relationship banking which argues that banking competition can have a negative effect 
on the availability of finance for more informationally opaque firms by reducing the 
expected benefits of the investments in obtaining specific information from clients. 
Finally, the results call into question the use of market concentration as an indicator of 
competition. 
 
After this introduction, the structure of the paper is as follows. In section 2 we 
review the existing literature on the influence of banking competition on economic 
growth, both that which analyses its effect on the financial conditions of firms (cost and 
availability of finance) and that which directly studies its influence on economic growth 
at aggregate level. Section 3 describes the methodology to be used for the measurement 
of the market power of the banks, of external financial dependence, and the 
specification used to analyse the effect of competition on sector growth. Section 4 
describes the sources of information and variables used to obtain the empirical results 
shown in section 5. Section 6 analyses the sensitivity of results using various robustness 
tests. Finally, the conclusions are presented in section 7.  
 
 
2. Banking competition and growth: background 
 
Basically, there are two areas of research in which the direct or indirect effect of 
banking competition on economic growth has been analysed. In the first case, studies of 
the importance of relationship banking, as well as analysing the effect of the intensity 
and duration of banking relationships on firms’ conditions of finance, have been 
concerned to analyse the effect of competition in the banking markets on the terms of 
the finance granted, i.e. both on the cost of financing and on the availability of credit, 
which in the long term affects investment and economic growth. In the second case, a 
small number of studies have analysed directly the effect of banking competition on 
economic growth using aggregate sector information for a sample of countries. 
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Relationship lending, banking competition and finance conditions 
 
In a market in which perfect information exists and the agents know perfectly 
the quality of the goods being exchanged, the existence of market power implies that a 
price is set above that of equilibrium (equal to the marginal cost) and that the quantity 
of goods or services traded is less than competitive equilibrium. Consequently, greater 
competition in the banking markets will imply a lower price of credit and greater credit 
availability. This will result in higher economic growth since the investment in 
productive activities will not face restrictions on the availability of funds. 
 
However, the financial sector in general, and the banking sector in particular, are 
characterised by the existence of asymmetries of information between banks and 
borrowers. These asymmetries may prevent some exchanges which, had they not 
existed, would have taken place. In this sense, one of the ways in which financial 
intermediaries can reduce or mitigate asymmetries of information is through repeated 
interaction with the client and the establishment of relationships of trust, all of which 
receives the name of relationship banking (see Boot, 2000). By means of these lasting 
relationships the financial institution acquires soft and informal information which 
allows it to screen and monitor its clients more efficiently, making possible the 
exchange of lendable funds which otherwise might not have taken place. 
 
In the field of relationship banking, some studies find that a lasting relationship 
with the client, though it does not generate benefits in terms of lower costs of finance, 
does favour access to finance (Petersen and Rajan, 1994; Elsas and Kanhen, 1998; 
Harhoff and Karting, 1998; Cole, 1998) or requires the client to offer fewer assets in 
guarantee (Chakrabortt and Hu, 2006; Degryse and Van Cayseele, 2000). At the same 
time, the lasting relationship of trust gives the bank market power over its clients, who 
become informationally captured (hold-up problem). It is therefore possible for lasting 
relationships with the client to generate market power and at the same time to favour 
access to finance for a larger number of firms. Consequently a positive relationship 
could be observed between market power in the banking sector and economic growth. 
 
One of the studies that has had most subsequent influence on the analysis of the 
effect of banking competition on the determination of the value of the relationship 
between the bank and the borrowing firm is that of Petersen and Rajan (1995). These 
authors develop a theoretical model that demonstrates that when the banking markets 
are competitive, the banks have fewer incentives to invest in relationship building, the 
borrowing firms being subjected to greater financial constraints. The empirical testing 
of the model with data on American SMEs shows that firms situated in more 
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competitive (less concentrated) markets are subjected to greater financial constraints. 
Berlin and Mester (1999) also find a negative effect of competition on the cost of 
finance, since they show that rate-insensitive core deposits allow for intertemporal 
smoothing in lending rates. 
  
D´Auria et al. (1999) analyse the importance of relationship banking for the cost 
of banking finance and the availability of credit. As a control variable, they include the 
degree of banking competition in the four principal areas of Italy, proxied by the 
Herfindahl index in each area. Their results indicate that an increase in concentration 
causes an increase in the cost of financing, which is interpreted as meaning that an 
increase in competition decreases the interest rates set by the banks. Nevertheless, the 
economic impact of concentration on the rate of interest on loans is very small. 
 
 Also for the Italian case, Angelini et al. (1998) analyse the effect of relationship 
banking on the conditions of financing for firms, including as a control variable the 
concentration of the local markets in loans or deposits. Their results indicate that 
concentration is not a statistically significant variable, in contrast to the evidence 
offered by Petersen and Rajan (1995).  
 
 Degryse and Ongena (2005) analyse the effects of the geographical distance 
between the firm and the lending bank, on the one hand, and between the firm and the 
competing banks on the other, on the interest rate on loans to small firms using the 
credit portfolio of a large Belgian bank. As control variables they introduce the effect of 
banking competition proxied by the number of branches of competitors and the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman index of concentration. In the case of concentration, the effect on 
the cost of finance is positive and significant, though of very small magnitude: an 
increase in the value of the index from less than 1000 points (competitive market) to 
more than 1800 (highly concentrated) would increase the interest rate by only 3.5 basic 
points. 
 
 Finally, the study by Carbó, Rodríguez and Udell (2006), though it does not 
analyse the role of relationship banking in the conditions of finance for firms, the frame 
of reference of the study is that of relationship banking. Specifically, Carbó et al. (2006) 
analyse the effect of banking competition on the financial constraints on Spanish SMEs 
using the Lerner index as indicator of competition. Their results support the market 
power hypothesis, insofar as the rationing of credit is greater for firms situated in less 
competitive banking markets (with a higher value of the Lerner index for banks located 
in that market). However, the result is just the opposite when they use indices of 
concentration to measure competitive rivalry, which shows the problems associated 
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with the use of indices of concentration, and therefore with the possible validity of the 
results of studies that proxy competition by means of the index of concentration. 
 
 
Banking competition and economic growth: cross-country analysis 
 
As stated earlier, the mechanism through which financial development facilitates 
economic growth is made explicit in Rajan and Zingales (1998). Studies carried out 
before had merely observed the existence of a positive correlation between these two 
variables, without establishing the direction of causality. Although King and Levine 
(1993a) investigate precisely this problem of causality and show that the predetermined 
component of financial development is a good predictor of growth over the next 10 to 
30 years, Rajan and Zingales put forward two arguments that call into question King 
and Levine’s results. First, the positive correlation between financial development and 
economic growth may reflect a problem of omitted variable related to both variables, 
such as the saving rate. And second, the variables that proxy financial development (like 
stock market capitalisation as a percentage of GDP) may be leading indicators of future 
growth rather than causal factors. For these reasons, the contribution of Rajan and 
Zingales is to design an empirical test that makes explicit the mechanisms through 
which financial development affects growth. They propose, therefore, a test of causality 
that corrects both for country and sectoral effects. Rajan and Zingales consider a 
mechanism whereby financial development facilitates firms’ access to external finance, 
especially to those most dependent on financing, thus propitiating increased investment 
and economic growth.  
 
Secondly, as remarked by Cetorelli and Gamberra (2001), though there are a 
number of studies of the effect of financial development on economic growth, the 
evidence on the effect of market structure is very limited. With this aim, Cetorelli and 
Gamberra extend the model of Rajan and Zingales (1998) by introducing as an 
explanatory variable of economic sector growth the concentration of the national 
banking markets, offering empirical evidence for the same sample of 41 countries and 
36 sectors in the period 1980-90. The principal limitation of Cetorelli and Gamberra’s 
study is that they use market concentration as a proxy for banking competition with 
arguments such as “whether the underlying industry structure is unconcentrated, thus 
approximating perfectly competitive conditions, or whether instead market power is 
concentrated among few banking institutions”. 
 
Dell´Ariccia and Bonaccarsi (2004) also use market concentration (together with 
other indicators of market power) to analyse the effect of banking competition on the 
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creation of firms in the Italian non-financial sector. Their results show a non-
monotonous relationship between banking competition and the creation of firms, with a 
range in which increases in market power can be beneficial. Consistent with the theories 
that argue that competition can reduce the availability of credit for the more 
informationally opaque firms, the results indicate that banking competition is less 
favourable for the creation of firms in industrial sectors where asymmetries of 
information are greater. 
 
 Given the limitations on the use of indicators of market concentration to proxy 
competition, the recent study by Claessens and Laeven (2005) is the first to analyse the 
effect of banking competition on economic growth using an indicator of competition 
based on the theory of industrial organisation. Specifically, Claessens and Laeven use 
the results of a previous study (Claessens and Laeven, 2004) in which they calculate the 
H-statistic for 20 countries, though the analysis of its effect on economic growth is 
reduced to 16 countries. Their main conclusion is that the most competitive banking 
systems can reduce hold-up problems and the costs of financial intermediation, 
favouring the access of firms to external finance. Furthermore, given the low degree of 
correlation between the H-statistic and market concentration, the indicators of 
concentration do not help to forecast sector growth. 
 
 
3. Methodology 
 
3.1. Model specification 
 The basic model of reference for analysing the effect of banking competition on 
economic growth takes as its starting point the specification adopted in Rajan and 
Zingales (1998), subsequently expanded in Cetorelli and Gamberra (2001) and 
Claessens and Laeven (2005) to analyse the effect of market structure and banking 
competition on economic growth.  
In the initial study by Rajan and Zingales (1998), the specification focuses on 
analysing the effect of financial development, and consequently on testing whether the 
sectors most dependent on external finance present higher rates of growth in countries 
with a higher level of financial development. The innovation of the specification is to 
introduce the interaction between a country characteristic (financial development) and a 
industry characteristic (external financial dependence), thus avoiding some problems of 
identification present in the cross-country regressions habitual in the literature on 
economic growth. Moreover, as commented by Claessens and Laeven (2005), the 
 10
specification is less subject to the criticisms of omitted variable bias or model 
specification than are traditional approaches that relate financial sector development 
directly to economic growth. 
 The expansion of the Rajan and Zingales model to test the effect of the degree of 
banking competition on growth takes into account the mechanism by which competitive 
rivalry in the banking markets affects growth, which is through firms’ financial 
dependence. Thus the introduction of the financial development variable interacting 
with the indicator of banking competition permits us to verify whether the sectors that 
require most external finance grow faster in countries with more competition in their 
banking systems, or whether, on the contrary, higher levels of market power facilitate 
access to finance for firms that would not have obtained it in highly competitive 
contexts. With this second hypothesis we would observe a positive relationship between 
the level of market power and economic growth. Thus, following the specification of 
Claessens and Laeven (2005), the reference model to be estimated is as follows: 
, 1 2
3 , 4
5 ,
*
*
j k j k
j k j k
j k j k
Growth Constant Sector Dummies Country Dummies
Industry shareinvalue added External Dependence Financial Development
External Dependence Banking Competition
ψ ψ
ψ ψ
ψ ε
= + + +
+ +
+
 
           (1) 
where j=sector, k=country, Growth= average annual real growth rate of value added of 
sector j in country k, and Banking competition is the indicator of degree of banking 
competition in country k (Lerner index, H-statistic, or, alternatively, an indicator of 
market concentration). 
The sector and country dummies capture the influence of effects specific to each 
sector or country, respectively. The beginning-of-period sector share in value added 
captures the possible “convergence” effect at sectoral level, insofar as the sectors with 
large initial shares usually grow at a slower rate, so a negative ψ3 could be expected. 
Also, as pointed out by Guiso et al. (2004), the inclusion of the initial share in total 
value added avoids the bias derived from the possible correlation between financial 
development and sector specialisation, so it is necessary to estimate the effect of 
financial development on sector growth net of any effect that it may have through sector 
specialisation1. 
 
                                                 
1 The basis of the argument is that financial development can affect both the growth of a sector and the 
pattern of specialisation, so that it incentivises the less financially developed countries to specialise in 
sectors less dependent on external finance. 
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3.2. The measurement of banking competition 
 
In all the studies referred to above that analyse the influence of banking competition 
on conditions of financing (and therefore, in the final instance, on economic growth), 
the intensity of banking competition is proxied through a market concentration index.  
 
However, in parallel, there exists an abundance of recent studies that show the 
limitations of proxying the intensity of banking competition by measures of market 
concentration. Thus, the theory of contestable markets2 demonstrates that the result of 
perfect competition can be found even in highly concentrated market situations and that 
a collusive agreement can be reached with a large number of firms. Therefore, the 
degree of competition is not necessarily related to the number of competitors and/or to 
the concentration of the market, but depends on the conditions of entry into the sector. 
 
On the empirical side, recent studies have also shown the inadequacy of using 
market concentration as an indicator of competition (Berger et al., 2004; Maudos and 
Fernández de Guevara, 2004; Fernández de Guevara et al., 2005; Claessens and Laeven, 
2004; among others), pointing to the necessity of using alternative indicators.  
 
 For these reasons, and with the aim of solving the limitations implicit in the use 
of structural measures of competition based on the concentration of the markets, in the 
field of banking economics various instruments of competition are used from the so-
called “new empirical industrial organization”.  
 
In our case, competition is measured through the Lerner index of market power 
and the Panzar and Rosse H-statistic. In the first case, the existing studies (Fernández de 
Guevara et al., 2005, Carbó, Rodríguez and Udell, 2006) show that there is very little 
(and even no) correlation with the indicators of concentration. In the case of the H-
statistic, as well as the studies by Claessens and Laeven (2004 and 2005), the recent 
study by Carbó, Humphrey, Maudos and Molyneux (2006) also shows a low correlation 
with the indicators of market concentration, questioning, therefore, the results of studies 
that use structural indicators of competition. 
 
The Lerner index of market power 
 
The Lerner index measures the capacity to set interest rates above marginal costs 
as a proportion of prices, this difference between price and marginal cost being the 
                                                 
2 Baumol (1982) and Baumol, Panzar and Willig (1982). 
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essence of market power. Given the limitations of the statistical information available 
we assume, as do Fernández de Guevara et al. (2005 and 2006) and Carbó et al. (2006), 
that banking production is proxied by total assets, a joint index of market power being 
estimated for the total of banking activity, defined as follows3: 
 
 
*
*        
TA TA
TA
r cm
r
⎡ ⎤−⎣ ⎦  (2) 
where rTA is proxied by the ratio of total revenue to total assets, and marginal costs 
include both operating and financial costs. 
  
The Panzar and Rosse methodology 
The H-statistic of Panzar and Rosse (1987) has also been extensively used to 
analyse the degree of competition in the banking markets. Thus, in the case of European 
banks, Molyneux, Lloyd-Williams, and Thornton (1994), De Bandt and Davis (2000), 
Bikker and Haaf (2002), among others, show the existence of monopolistic competition 
on the basis of the H-statistic. Also the recent study by Claessens and Laeven (2004) 
examines the determinants of market power in a sample of more than 50 countries 
(including Europe), the results of the H-statistic being compatible with the existence of 
monopolistic competition in most of the countries analysed. Their results also show the 
absence of any link between competitive conditions and market structure.  
 
The essence of the Panzar and Rosse methodology (1987) is to analyse the 
elasticity of revenues to variations in factor input prices by estimating a reduced 
revenue equation. As demonstrated by Panzar and Rosse (1987), on the assumption that 
firms operate at their long term equilibrium levels, a value of the H-statistic (defined as 
the sum of the elasticities of the revenue of the bank with respect to the bank´s input 
prices) equal to 1 is consistent with a situation of perfect competition; a value of H 
between 0 and 1 indicates the existence of monopolistic competition, while values equal 
to or less than 0 are consistent with a situation of monopoly4. 
 
 
 
                                                 
3 See, for example, Fernández de Guevara et al. (2005) for the analytical derivation of the Lerner index 
from a model of behaviour of banking firms. 
4 In perfect competition, a proportional variation in the input prices induce a proportional change in 
revenue, since the output that minimises average costs does not vary, while the price of the output varies 
in the same proportion. In a market with monopolistic competition, revenue grows less than 
proportionally to variations in the input prices because the demand faced by firms in the products market 
is inelastic. In the case of monopoly, a growth in the price of inputs increases marginal costs, reduces the 
equilibrium level of production and consequently, reduces revenue.  
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Indicators of market concentration 
 
In order to test the robustness of results and to analyse the problems that may be 
presented in studies that value the effect of banking competition on economic growth by 
means of indicators of concentration, in this study we will use three indicators of 
concentration for each country: R3 (the market share of the 3 largest banks), R5 (share 
of the 5 largest) and  the Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HH), which is defined as the 
sum of the square of the market shares of all the banks that compete in the market. 
Although previous studies that have analysed the effect of concentration on growth have 
used R3 (or R5) the disadvantage of these absolute indicators of concentration is that 
the relative position of a country may differ depending on the indicator used. 
Furthermore, these indicators do not take into account the number of banks in each 
sector, so the use of the Herfindahl- Hirschman index as indicator of concentration is 
more reliable. 
 
 
3.3. Financial dependence 
 Following the approach of Rajan and Zingales (1998), the identification of the 
external financial dependence at the sectoral level is based on the available information 
on a country with developed capital markets in which firms do not face frictions in their 
access to financing. 
 The choice of a financially developed country to act as benchmark (the USA the 
study by Rajan and Zingales, 1998) is one way to avoid the problem of identification 
between the demand for external funds and its supply, as the higher the degree of 
financial development the fewer are the restrictions on access to the supply of finance, 
the latter being precisely what we want to measure.  
In our case, because of the availability of information, the benchmark country is 
the United Kingdom. Since the database used to proxy the degree of financial 
dependence (Amadeus –Bureau van Dijk) only contains information on European firms, 
we use the European country with the most highly developed financial markets and with 
a productive structure sufficiently diversified for there to be information on all sectors 
of activity, i.e. the United Kingdom. For example, with data referring to 2003, the last 
year that we will use in the study, stock market capitalisation represents 120.9% of GDP 
in the United Kingdom, as against the 66% of the EU-15 average and the 115.4% of the 
USA (Source: European Commission, 2005: “Financial Integration Monitor”). The 
degree of financial development of the United Kingdom is therefore closer to that of the 
USA than to the average of the EU-15. 
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The use of a benchmark is also based on the assumption that there are 
technological reasons (project scale, gestation period, etc.) why some sectors depend 
more than others on external finance, and that these reasons are the same in all 
countries. Thus, the assumption is that if a sector in the United Kingdom has certain 
technological characteristics, those same characteristics will be present in the rest of the 
countries in the sample analysed. The fact that it is technological reasons that determine 
the degree of financial dependence of a certain sector implies that it is more appropriate 
to use the average of the indicator of financial dependence for a period long enough for 
the measurement not to be affected by possible shocks of financial supply or demand 
external to the firm. However, too long a period could mean that the production 
technology of a sector could change, and therefore, so could the degree of financial 
dependence. In the study we consider it adequate to take the average of the indicator of 
financial dependence over ten years. 
As we will remark later when describing the empirical approach used, the degree 
of external financial dependence will be measured for the firms that are quoted on the 
Stock Exchange. As remarked above, since what we want to measure is the availability 
(supply) of finance (and not the equilibrium between supply and demand) in frictionless 
capital markets, the quantity of finance captured will tend to coincide with that desired 
in the case of quoted firms, as these are less restricted in their access to external finance 
than others of smaller size whose only sources of finance are the individual 
entrepreneurs’ own resources or banking finance. In other words, the assumption is that 
quoted firms face a perfectly elastic supply curve for funds. 
 
4. Sources of information, sample and variables used 
The achievement of the objectives of the study requires us to combine different 
sources of statistical information on variables of real and financial activity. In the first 
case, it is necessary to possess information on economic growth at sectoral level for the 
countries analysed, which is the dependent variable of the model. In the case of 
financial variables, we need information in order to proxy the financial development of 
economies and the financial dependence of sectors, as well as the level of competition 
in the banking markets of each country.  
The information needed to measure the economic growth (our dependent 
variable) is taken from The 60-Industry Database for 57 sectors (classified in ISIC rev. 
3) of the Groningen Growth and Development Centre5, which is comparable with the 
                                                 
5 The database is available at http://www.ggdc.net/dseries/60-industry.html. 
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STAN database of the OECD, and provides information with broad and homogeneous 
dissagregation for a large number of countries. The database contains information on 
value added for agriculture, industry, construction and services in 26 countries (the EU-
15, Central and Eastern Europe, the USA, Canada, Japan, Korea and Australia) for the 
period 1979-2003. Nevertheless, as we will comment later, the period finally used is 
1993-2003. The variable to be explained will be the average annual growth rate of real 
value added for each sector in each country from 1993 to 2003.  
The database of the Groningen Growth and Development Centre presents 
various advantages over the one used in Rajan and Zingales (1998). First, it directly 
offers the deflators of gross value added for each of the sectors of activity included. It is 
important to use specific deflators for each sector, since the use of a common deflator 
for all sectors of activity (the Producer Price Index used by Rajan and Zingales, 1998) 
may introduce error in the measurement of the real variations. For example, in the 
telecommunications or office equipment sector, prices have evolved very differently 
from the prices of the economy as a whole. Using an aggregate deflator would cause us 
to compute part of the price variation as a variation in real activity. Secondly, as already 
remarked, it allows us to carry out the analysis for all sectors of the economy, without 
having to circumscribe it to manufacturing sectors. However, the use of this statistical 
source limits the range of countries that can be studied, and as it does not offer the 
number of firms in each sector, it does not permit us to analyse the effects of financial 
development and banking competition on the average size of firms and/or the creation 
of new firms. 
Tables 1 and 2 show the sectors available in the database of the Groningen 
Growth and Development Centre, and the temporal availability of information by 
countries, respectively. In the first case, as mentioned above, the database contains 
information for 57 sectors of the total of economic activity (agriculture, industry, 
construction and services) classified according to the ISIC rev. 3. In the second case, for 
some of the countries in the sample (specifically, Canada, Korea and Norway) the last 
year available is 2002 (instead of 2003), so for these three countries the average growth 
rate of value added refers to the period 1993-2002. 
The information on financial development is proxied through the variables most 
commonly used, such as the credit/GDP ratio, stock market capitalisation/GDP, and the 
sum of both (total capitalisation/GDP). The first ratio is taken from the International 
Financial Statistics database of the International Monetary Fund, while stock market 
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capitalisation is obtained directly from the World Development Indicators database 
published by the United Nations. 
Each country’s degree of financial dependence is proxied on the basis of the 
Amadeus database (Bureau van Dijk), which contains financial and economic 
information on more than 7 million European firms. For each firm, the database offers 
information on the sector of activity to which it belongs according to different sector 
classifications. Specifically, the Amadeus data used were obtained according to the 
NACE Rev.1.1 classification. To homogenise the sector classifications a double process 
of conversion was necessary. First the Amadeus data were reclassified according to the 
ISIC rev. 3.1. Second, the sectors were aggregated according to the ISIC rev. 3 
classification, to obtain, as a result, the aggregations offered by the database of the 
Groningen Growth and Development Centre. The equivalences between classifications 
were made on the basis of the four digits disaggregations obtained from the United 
Nations6. 
Rajan and Zingales (1998) present a measure of external financial dependence 
on the basis of the flow of investments made by the firm that cannot be financed with 
the cash flow generated. The information available in Amadeus does not permit 
financial dependence to be calculated in this way, so it is proxied by means of balance 
sheet data from the banks. Specifically, the degree of external financial dependence is 
proxied as the ratio of debt with cost to current liabilities. Specifically, the definition 
used is as follows: 
[ ] [ : ]
[ ] [ : ] [ ]
Noncurrent liabilities Current liabilities loans
Total assets Current liabilities creditors Other current liabilities
+
− −  (3) 
With data on the quoted firms of the United Kingdom, the above ratio is calculated for 
each sector, aggregating in the numerator and in the denominator the data on the firms 
quoted in each year. Subsequently we obtain the average of the annual data during the 
period 1993-2003, so that the degree of financial dependence refers to the average of the 
period. As suggested by Rajan and Zingales (1998), the use of the average of the data 
smoothes temporal fluctuations and reduces the effects of outliers. Altogether, for the 
United Kingdom, information is available for 9,087 firms that are quoted on the capital 
markets.  
 Table 3 shows the degree of external financial dependence for the different 
sectors of activity. As can be appreciated from the table, of the 57 sectors initially 
                                                 
6 http://unstats.un.org/unsd/class/default.htm 
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considered, the criteria used for the calculation of the degree of dependence on external 
finance (listed companies) oblige us to ignore nine sectors of activity. 
 The sector presenting the highest level of external financial dependence is 
“Radio and television receivers” (1.31), followed at a considerable distance by “Legal, 
technical and advertising” (0.72), “Inland transport” (0.71) and “Air transport” (0.69), 
while at the opposite extreme we find sectors “Research and development” (0.16), 
“Office machinery” (0.23), “Building and repairing of ships and boats” (0.27), and 
“Other instruments” (0.27).  
In the case of the measurement of banking competition, the information 
necessary for estimating the Lerner index, the H-statistic and the indices of 
concentration of the banking markets are taken from the BankScope database of the 
Bureau van Dijk. Specifically, the database contains information at firm level on the 
financial statements (balance sheets and profit and loss accounts) of the banks. Of the 
total of the countries available in the database, the sample used is formed by the 
banking sectors of those countries with information available on the economic growth 
of the sector value added described above, with the exception of the four countries of 
Eastern Europe (Hungary, Slovakia, Poland and the Czech Republic). The reason for the 
exclusion is the low representativeness of the banks of these countries supplied by 
BankScope. In total, the sample is formed by 21 countries. Furthermore, although the 
database contains information from the mid 1980s onwards, the sample is 
unrepresentative before 1993, this being the reason for selecting the period 1993-2003. 
Table 4 shows the composition of the sample used to measure the indicators of 
banking competition. The sample includes commercial banks, savings banks, credit 
cooperatives, and other types of financial institutions. Of the total of observations 
available in BankScope, we eliminated those banks: a) that did not offer information for 
any of the variables necessary to measure the indicators of competition and, b) with 
information of doubtful reliability or outliers. In this last case, we eliminated the 
observations whose prices for banking output (total assets), and for the inputs necessary 
to estimate the marginal costs used to construct the Lerner indices, are more than +/- 2.5 
times the standard deviation. With these criteria, the sample is formed by an unbalanced 
panel of 36,281 observations. 
The calculation of the Lerner index according to expression (2) requires us to 
proxy the average price of banking activity and to estimate the corresponding marginal 
cost. In the first case, the price is obtained as the ratio of bank revenue/total assets, 
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while marginal costs are estimated from a translog cost function according to the 
following expression7: 
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According to expression (4) the total costs of bank i  (Ci) depend on total assets (TA) 
and on the input prices (w1=price of labour, proxied as the ratio of personnel costs to 
total assets; w2=price of physical capital, proxied as the ratio of operating costs other 
than personnel to the value of fixed assets; and w3=price of deposits, proxied as the 
ratio of financial costs to deposits) and on technical change (proxied by a tendency, 
Trend). In the estimation of the costs function, fixed effects are introduced to capture 
the effect of possible unobserved variables specific to each bank. Symmetry and linear 
homogeneity in input prices restrictions are imposed. 
The first column of table 5 contains the value of the Lerner index for each of the 
21 banking sectors analysed. The index of each country is obtained as the weighted 
average of the value of the Lerner indices of the banks in the sample, using as weighting 
factor the total assets of each bank. The information shows the existence of marked 
differences in the degree of competition among the countries of the sample, highlighting 
the high values (low competitiveness) of the USA, Ireland and Spain, and the low 
values of Luxembourg and Belgium.  
Following Bikker and Haaf (2002) and Claessens and Laeven (2004), the H-
statistic is based on the estimation of the following revenue function: 
 
3 2
1 1
log( / ) log logJ nit j it it it i it
j n
IT TA w S E uα β λ
= =
= + + + +∑ ∑  (5) 
where the sub-indices i and t represent the bank and the year, respectively, IT= total 
revenue (financial and non-financial), TA= total assets, w is the input prices (labour, 
lendable funds and physical capital), S is a scale variable (specifically, the total assets) 
which measures the degree of utilisation of the installed capacity at which each firm 
operates and controls for potential size effects, and E are exogenous variables specific to 
each bank which affect revenue (specifically, the ratio of equity to total assets, the ratio 
                                                 
7 The approach to the measurement of the price of banking activity and to the estimation of marginal costs 
is similar to that used in Maudos and Fernández de Guevara (2004), Fernández de Guevara et al. (2005 
and 2006) and Carbó et al. (2006). 
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of loans to total assets, and the ratio of deposits to total lendable funds). The revenue 
equation is estimated separately for each banking sector and fixed effects (λi) are 
introduced in order to capture the influence of other bank-specific unobservable factors 
that may affect its revenue. 
 Once equation (5) has been estimated, the H-statistic is calculated as the sum of 
the elasticities of the total revenue with respect to the input prices:
3
1
j
j
H α
=
=∑ . 
Table 5 shows the values of the H-statistic and the p-value of the test of the null 
hypothesis that the value of the statistic will be equal to 0, or alternatively, 1. In all 
cases the value of the statistic is between 0 and 1, so the situation of monopolistic 
competition cannot be rejected, in all the banking sectors with the exception of Portugal 
where the results are compatible with the existence of perfect competition (the value of 
H is not statistically different from 1)8. The lowest values of the H-statistic correspond 
to the banking sectors of Denmark (0.22) and Sweden (0.36), indicating the existence of 
greater market power in these two countries. At the opposite extreme, and therefore 
with greater competitive rivalry, stand the banking sectors of Portugal and Greece. 
If structural indicators of competition are used, the results agree irrespective of 
the indicator used. Thus, at the top, with more concentrated markets, are the banking 
sectors of Finland and Canada, while at the opposite extreme stand the USA and 
Germany.  
Table 6 summarises the variables and sources of information used, the 
descriptive statistics being shown in table 7. Table 8 reports the correlations among the 
variables used.  In this latter case, some outstanding correlations are: a) a low negative 
correlation between the indicators of financial development and economic growth, 
though it is not statistically significant9; b) economic growth is negatively correlated 
with the initial industry share in value added, pointing to the existence of a process of 
convergence; c) the correlations of the indicators of market structure, or of competition, 
with economic growth are not significant, with the exception of banking market 
concentration which is positively correlated with growth. 
The analysis of the correlations among the different indicators of banking 
competition deserves a special mention. In the case of structural indicators, the 
correlation among the three indicators of concentration is very high (0.99 between R3 
                                                 
8 The validity of the H-statistic rests on the assumption that sectors are in long term equilibrium. To test 
this assumption, we re-estimate the revenue equation replacing the dependent variable by ROA (return on 
assets), so the long term equilibrium is compatible with a value of the sum of the elasticities associated 
with the input prices equal to 0. In practically all cases it is not possible to reject this hypothesis. 
9 The correlation is positive if financial development interacts with external financial dependence. 
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and R5, and 0.94 between R3 or R5 and HH). In the case of indicators based on the 
theory of industrial organisation, the correlation between the Lerner index and the H-
statistic is, as expected, negative and statistically significant, since a higher value of the 
H-statistic implies greater competition (and therefore, lower value of the Lerner index). 
However, the correlation of market concentration is only significant with the H-statistic, 
though it is positive, implying that the most highly concentrated banking sectors present 
greater competitive rivalry, contrary to the usual interpretation. This last result shows, in 
line with previous studies (Fernández de Guevara et al., 2005, Claessens and Laeven, 
2005; Carbó et al., 2006), the inadequacy of using concentration as a measure of 
competition. 
 
5. Empirical results 
 In this section we present the results of the estimation of equation (1) where the 
dependent variable is the average annual real growth rate in the period 1993-2003 of the 
value added of each sector in each country. In each regression, estimated by ordinary 
least squares, industry and country dummies are introduced, as well as the initial share 
in value added. Initially, with the aim of replicating the results of Rajan and Zingales 
(1998) with the sample used in this study, we offer the results referring to the effect of 
financial development on economic growth without including therefore the proxies for 
competition in the banking markets. At the end of each table we offer the calculation of 
the economic impact associated with financial development and banking competition. 
Specifically, last rows of the tables shows the differential in economic growth between 
a sector situated in percentile 75 of the distribution and another sector situated at 
percentile 25 when they are located in a country with a level of financial development 
and/or banking competition situated in percentile 75 relative to another country situated 
in percentile 25 (with less financial development and lower level of competition). 
 Column 1 of table 9 shows the results of the basic specification of Rajan and 
Zingales. In line with these authors, the results show that the sectors most dependent on 
external finance grow faster in countries with more developed financial markets, 
irrespective of the indicator of financial development used (stock market capitalisation 
/GDP, credit/GDP or total capitalisation/GDP). Specifically, the economic impact of 
going from a situation of low financial development (as in the case of Greece which is 
in percentile 25 of the distribution) to another of higher development (Sweden, situated 
in percentile 75), translates into approximately 0.50 percentage points of growth of the 
more financially dependent sectors. Consequently, in line with the prior studies by 
Rajan and Zingales (1998), Cetorelli and Gamberra (2001), Guiso et al. (2004) and 
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Claessens and Laeven (2005), we obtain evidence favourable to the hypothesis that 
financial development facilitates economic growth. 
 Taking as reference the total capitalisation as proxy variable for financial 
development, if we additionally introduce into the regression the effect of banking 
competition, the results differ depending on the indicator used (table 10). Thus if the 
degree of competition is proxied by the concentration of the banking market, the effect 
is negative, though it is statistically significant only for the Herfindahl index. This result 
contrasts with the evidence obtained by Cetorelli and Gamberra (2001) who find that 
the most concentrated banking sectors promote the economic growth of those sectors 
that depend more heavily on external finance by facilitating the access to credit of the 
youngest firms. However, our evidence agrees with that of Claessens and Laeven (2004) 
who report a negative (though not significant) coefficient for the interaction of 
concentration (R3) with financial dependence. 
 If instead of using the concentration of the market as proxy for competition we 
introduce the H-statistic (column 4) into the regression, the results re-confirm the 
positive effect of financial development on economic growth. The interaction of the H-
statistic with the financial dependence variable presents a negative sign and is 
statistically significant, implying that greater market power generates greater economic 
growth. This result contrasts with the evidence obtained by Claessens and Laeven 
(2004) as it implies a negative effect of banking competition on economic growth. 
 In the last column of table 10 we show the results when the degree of 
competition in the banking system is proxied by means of the Lerner index of market 
power. In this case, the influence of the interaction between the Lerner index and the 
degree of financial dependence on growth is not statistically significant. 
The comparison of the economic impact on economic growth associated with 
financial development and with the indicators of competition shows different results 
depending on the indicator of competition. Thus in the case of market concentration, 
passing from the concentration of a country situated in percentile 25 of the distribution 
(United Kingdom) to another situated in percentile 75 (Norway in terms of R5 and 
Herfindahl index or Belgium in terms of R3) translates into a reduction that varies 
between 0.09 and 0.32 percentage points (pp.), as against an increase of around 0.45 pp. 
if financial development increases. However, in terms of the H-statistic, passing from a 
situation of low competitive rivalry (Canada, in percentile 25 with an H-statistic value 
of 0.58) to another of greater rivalry (Belgium, in percentile 75 with an H-statistic value 
of 0.77) it translates into a fall of 0.53 pp. in the rate of economic growth, a value 
similar to that of the increase in the degree of financial development (0.51 pp.). 
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6. Robustness tests 
We now turn to present some robustness tests in order to analyse the sensitivity 
of the results. Specifically, as well as the tests already carried out in terms of different 
indicators of banking competition, these tests make reference to: 1) the initial values of 
financial development and banking competition; 2) the sectors used; and 3) the 
exclusion of the country used as benchmark for the estimation of the degree of financial 
dependence. 
 Given that the effect of banking competition and financial development on 
economic growth is not contemporaneous but affects future growth, it is of interest to 
analyse the initial effect of financial development and banking competition on the 
average growth of the period analysed. With this objective, table 11 shows the results 
proxying the indicators of financial development and banking competition in the initial 
year (1993). In the case of the H-statistic, the value taken as reference is the statistic 
estimated in the sub-period 1993-9810.  
 In the case of financial development, the results of table 11 confirm once again 
the positive effect of the interaction between financial dependence and financial 
development on economic growth, so that the sectors most dependent on external 
finance experience higher rates of growth in countries with a higher level of financial 
development. 
In the case of the structural indicators of banking competition, the results again 
show a negative effect irrespective of the indicator used, the Herfindahl index being the 
most relevant from the point of view of statistical significance. As we have commented 
earlier, this result contrasts with the evidence found by Cetorelli and Camberra (2001) 
though we should not forget the limitations of the use of measurements of market 
concentration to proxy the degree of banking competition. 
 The results change radically when we use indicators from the new empirical 
industrial organisation perspective to measure banking competition. In the case of the 
H-statistic (column 4), the effect is once again negative and statistically significant, 
meaning that an increase in competition (higher value of the H-statistic) translates into a 
slower rate of growth of sector value added. In the case of the Lerner index, now the 
sign is positive and statistically significant, which also shows the negative effects of 
banking competition on economic growth. As we have remarked, this positive link 
between the levels of market power and economic growth can be justified in the context 
                                                 
10 The estimation of the H-statistic requires a certain number of observations for each banking sector. For 
this reason, as an initial indicator of competition we estimate the H- statistic for the period 1993-98.  
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of relationship banking. To solve the problems of asymmetrical information in financial 
activity, banks can opt to establish close relationships with borrowers, which will 
facilitate their access to finance.  
The comparison of the differential effect on economic growth associated with 
increasing financial development and with the initial level of banking competition 
shows appreciably higher values in the case of financial development. Thus an increase 
in banking competition from percentile 25 to 75 of the distribution translates into a loss 
of 0.46 pp. when competition is proxied by the H-statistic and of 0.62 pp. when it is 
proxied by the Lerner index, the growth differential associated with financial 
development being 0.67 pp. 
The second test of robustness refers to the sector analysed. According to Rajan 
and Zingales (1998), their analysis (and therefore that of Cetorelli and Camberra, 2001; 
and Claessens and Laeven, 2005) refers to the manufacturing sector in order to reduce 
the dependence on country-specific factors such as the availability of natural resources. 
Specifically, the results of table 12 refer to the manufacturing sector, so from the total of 
sectors hitherto analysed we have eliminated the mining sector (sector 4), construction 
(sector 33) and all the services sectors (from 34 to 57). 
Taking as reference the specification in the initial year of the financial 
development and banking competition variables, the results referring to the 
manufacturing sector confirm once again the positive effect of financial development on 
the economic growth of the sectors most dependent on external finance. As regards the 
influence of market concentration, the results do not vary from those obtained in table 
11 for the total of sectors of the economy, confirming the negative effect of the 
Herfindahl index. Finally, the results are also robust when we use indicators of banking 
competition from the theory of industrial organisation, verifying the negative influence 
of competition on economic growth. 
 Finally, the results are maintained if from the total sample used we exclude the 
United Kingdom, which is the country used as benchmark for the estimation of the 
financial dependence variable11. 
 
 
                                                 
11The results are also robust if we include in the estimation the effect of variables specific to each country 
that are usually used in regressions to explain economic growth. Specifically, we include two explanatory 
variables: a) human capital (proxied by the average of the years of schooling attained by the population 
over 25 years of age –Source: Barro and Lee, 2000; and b) the initial GDP per capita, obtained from the 
OECD publication National Accounts. Results are available upon request to the authors. 
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7. Conclusions 
One of the questions that has received special attention in recent years is the 
analysis of the effect of financial development on economic growth. However, the effect 
of banking competition on economic growth has received much less attention as shown 
by the fact that to date (as far as we know) only two studies have been published that 
have presented empirical evidence on this important question. This is surprising if we 
take into account that the theory offers ambiguous results in respect of the effect of 
banking competition on growth, so it is a issue to be resolved empirically. Furthermore, 
the fact that the only two existing studies made use the same sample makes it even more 
necessary to bring additional empirical evidence with other samples that will permit 
testing of the robustness of the results so far obtained. 
In this context, the objective of the study is to contribute with additional 
evidence by analysing the effect of financial development and competition in the 
banking markets on economic growth using a sample of 53 sectors in 21 countries over 
the period 1993-2003. For this purpose, we expand the sector coverage of the sample, as 
the financial dependence and growth used by Rajan and Zingales (1998), Cetorelli and 
Gamberra (2001), and Claessens and Leaven (2005) are only of the manufacturing 
sector. Also, it is the only study that constructs the test from databases (especially in the 
case of the financial dependence variable) different from those of the original study by 
Petersen and Rajan (1998). Further contributions of the study are the use of two 
measures of banking competition based on the theory of industrial organisation, and the 
testing of the robustness of the results to the use of structural indicators of competition 
(market concentration).  
The results obtained show a positive effect of financial development on the 
economic growth of the sectors most dependent on external finance, confirming the 
results obtained in other studies. The results also show that the exercise of market power 
(proxied by the Lerner index or by the H-statistic) favours the growth of the sectors 
most dependent on external finance. These results, though in conflict with the recent 
evidence contributed by Claessens and Laeven (2004), are in agreement with recent 
contributions in the field of relationship banking which show that the banks with 
monopoly power have greater incentives to establish relationships with their clients by 
facilitating their access to credit and consequently reducing the financial constraints on 
firms (Dell´Ariccia and Marquez, 2004). The fact that the existence of asymmetries of 
information is a fundamental characteristic of the banking activity causes banks to seek 
to solve the asymmetries, in many cases, by establishing stable and long-lasting 
relationships with their clients. These relationships may confer market power on the 
banks, as the clients may become informationally “locked in” with the bank (hold-up 
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problem). Despite this greater market power, and despite the bank’s greater knowledge 
of the borrowers, it is possible for the latter to obtain finance on conditions which they 
would not have obtained otherwise. Having market power is important to be able to 
implement these relationship strategies because it guarantees that the banks will be able 
to recover their investment in the acquisition of the information (Boot and Thakor, 
2000) and to solve, therefore, the problems of asymmetrical information. 
The results of this study would seem to indicate that this situation may be 
occurring. The fact of finding a positive relationship between economic growth and 
market power would indicate that, in uncompetitive banking markets, the banks can 
offer better conditions of financing and make their banking relationships profitable in 
the long term as a consequence of their information monopoly (Rajan, 1992; Petersen 
and Rajan, 1995).  
 As in other studies (Claessens and Laeven, 2005; Carbó et al., 2006), the results 
are sensitive to the indicator of banking competition used (structural vs. non-structural), 
as an increase in concentration (usually interpreted as meaning less competition) 
translates into slower economic growth of the sectors most dependent on external 
finance, while an increase in market power (increases in the value of the Lerner index or 
reductions in the value of the H-statistic) brings faster growth. In consequence, these 
results call into question the use of market concentration as an indicator of competition. 
The results obtained are robust to different alternative specifications. 
Specifically, the results do not vary when the indicators of financial development and 
banking competition are dated in the initial year, or when the analysis is circumscribed 
to the manufacturing sector, or when the country used as a benchmark (UK) is excluded 
from the analysis. Finally, the growth differentials associated with changes in financial 
development or in the level of competition have been calculated, those associated with 
financial development being slightly higher.  
Finally, from the point of view of the implications for economic policy, the 
results obtained show the need to conjugate greater development of the financial 
markets with the exercise of a certain market power on the part of the financial 
intermediaries, given the pernicious effects of excessive competitive rivalry in the 
banking markets on the financial constraints on firms, and therefore on economic 
growth. 
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Table 1. Sectors of activity included in the 60-Industry Database of the Groningen 
Growth and Development Centre (GGDC) 
 
GGDC 
Sector Sector 
ISIC 
REV 3.
1 Agriculture 01 
2 Forestry 02 
3 Fishing 05 
4 Mining and quarrying 10-14 
5 Food, drink & tobacco 15-16 
6 Textiles 17 
7 Clothing 18 
8 Leather and footwear 19 
9 Wood & products of wood and cork 20 
10 Pulp, paper & paper products 21 
11 Printing & publishing 22 
12 Mineral oil refining, coke & nuclear fuel 23 
13 Chemicals   24 
14 Rubber & plastics 25 
15 Non-metallic mineral products 26 
16 Basic metals 27 
17 Fabricated metal products 28 
18 Mechanical engineering 29 
19 Office machinery 30 
20 Insulated wire 313 
21 Other electrical machinery and apparatus nec 31-313 
22 Electronic valves and tubes 321 
23 Telecommunication equipment 322 
24 Radio and television receivers 323 
25 Scientific instruments 331 
26 Other instruments 33-331 
27 Motor vehicles 34 
28 Building and repairing of ships and boats 351 
29 Aircraft and spacecraft 353 
30 Railroad equipment and transport equipment nec 352+359
31 Furniture, miscellaneous manufacturing; recycling 36-37 
32 Electricity, gas and water supply 40-41 
33 Construction 45 
34 Sale, maintenance and repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles; retail sale of 
automotive fuel 
50 
35 Wholesale trade and commission trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles 51 
36 Retail trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles; repair of personal and 
household goods 
52 
37 Hotels & catering 55 
 31
38 Inland transport 60 
39 Water transport 61 
40 Air transport 62 
41 Supporting and auxiliary transport activities; activities of travel agencies 63 
42 Communications 64 
43 Financial intermediation, except insurance and pension funding 65 
44 Insurance and pension funding, except compulsory social security 66 
45 Activities auxiliary to financial intermediation 67 
46 Real estate activities 70 
47 Renting of machinery and equipment 71 
48 Computer and related activities 72 
49 Research and development 73 
50 Legal, technical and advertising 741-3 
51 Other business activities, nec 749 
52 Public administration and defence; compulsory social security 75 
53 Education 80 
54 Health and social work 85 
55 Other community, social and personal services 90-93 
56 Private households with employed persons 95 
57 Extra-territorial organizations and bodies 99 
 
Source: Groningen Growth and Development Centre, 60-Industry Database, October 2005, 
http://www.ggdc.net/ 
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Table 2. Countries and periods considered for the measurement of economic 
growth 
 
 
Country Period 
Germany 1993-2003 
Australia 1993-2003 
Austria 1993-2003 
Belgium 1993-2003 
Canada 1993-2002 
Korea 1993-2002 
Denmark 1993-2003 
Spain 1993-2003 
USA 1993-2003 
Finland 1993-2003 
France 1993-2003 
Greece 1993-2003 
Netherlands 1993-2003 
Irland 1993-2003 
Italy 1993-2003 
Japan 1993-2003 
Luxembourg 1993-2003 
Norway 1993-2002 
Portugal 1993-2003 
United Kingdom 1993-2003 
Sweden 1993-2003 
 
Source: Groningen Growth and Development Centre, 60-Industry Database, October 2005, 
http://www.ggdc.net/ 
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Table 3. Financial dependence across sectors in the United Kingdom 
Averages over 1993-2003 
GGDC 
Sector Sector
Financial 
Dependence
1 Agriculture n.d.
2 Forestry n.d.
3 Fishing n.d.
4 Mining and quarrying 0.44
5 Food, drink & tobacco 0.52
6 Textiles 0.36
7 Clothing 0.31
8 Leather and footwear 0.32
9 Wood & products of wood and cork 0.44
10 Pulp, paper & paper products 0.36
11 Printing & publishing 0.55
12 Mineral oil refining, coke & nuclear fuel 0.42
13 Chemicals  0.51
14 Rubber & plastics 0.38
15 Non-metallic mineral products 0.50
16 Basic metals 0.36
17 Fabricated metal products 0.50
18 Mechanical engineering 0.52
19 Office machinery 0.23
20 Insulated wire n.d.
21 Other electrical machinery and apparatus nec 0.55
22 Electronic valves and tubes 0.24
23 Telecommunication equipment 0.31
24 Radio and television receivers 1.31
25 Scientific instruments 0.32
26 Other instruments 0.27
27 Motor vehicles 0.43
28 Building and repairing of ships and boats 0.27
29 Aircraft and spacecraft 0.56
30 Railroad equipment and transport equipment nec n.d.
31 Furniture, miscellaneous manufacturing; recycling 0.41
32 Electricity, gas and water supply 0.52
33 Construction 0.35
34 Sale, maintenance and repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles; 
retail sale of automotive fuel
0.46
35 Wholesale trade and commission trade, except of motor vehicles 
and motorcycles
0.47
36 Retail trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles; repair of 
personal and household goods
0.34
37 Hotels & catering 0.42
38 Inland transport 0.71
39 Water transport 0.41
40 Air transport 0.69
41 Supporting and auxiliary transport activities; activities of travel 
agencies
0.38
42 Communications 0.33
43 Financial intermediation, except insurance and pension funding 0.53
44 Insurance and pension funding, except compulsory social security n.d.
45 Activities auxiliary to financial intermediation 0.52
46 Real estate activities 0.45
47 Renting of machinery and equipment 0.62
48 Computer and related activities 0.52
49 Research and development 0.16
50 Legal, technical and advertising 0.72
51 Other business activities, nec 0.60
52 Public administration and defence; compulsory social security n.d.
53 Education 0.37
54 Health and social work 0.42
55 Other community, social and personal services 0.36
56 Private households with employed persons n.d.
57 Extra-territorial organizations and bodies n.d.   
Source: Amadeus (Bureau Van Dijk). 
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Table 4. Number of banks. 1993-2003 
 
 
Number of 
banks Total assets
Australia 183 0.50 1.05
Austria 995 2.74 0.89
Belgium 387 1.07 2.42
Canada 220 0.61 2.20
Germany 11,426 31.49 8.78
Denmark 851 2.35 0.70
Spain 1,246 3.43 3.19
Finland 100 0.28 0.57
France 2,859 7.88 13.08
Greece 172 0.47 0.32
Ireland 70 0.19 0.10
Italy 4,610 12.71 5.36
Japan 1,008 2.78 19.73
Korea 211 0.58 1.67
Luxembourg 378 1.04 0.70
Netherlands 160 0.44 0.43
Norway 292 0.80 0.25
Portugal 307 0.85 0.59
Sweden 265 0.73 0.83
United Kingdom 398 1.10 2.82
USA 10,143 27.96 34.31
Total 36,281 100.00 100.00
Number of 
banks
Share in the sample in 
terms of:
 
 
Source: BankScope (Bureau Van Dijk). 
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Table 5. Bank competition indicators 
 
H-statistic P-value H=0
P-value 
H=1
Australia 0.295 0.706 0.000 0.000 48.75 64.74 1,102
Austria 0.217 0.613 0.000 0.000 35.01 46.23 620
Belgium 0.188 0.772 0.000 0.000 50.46 69.09 1,215
Canada 0.256 0.580 0.000 0.000 56.11 76.59 2,200
Germany 0.227 0.641 0.000 0.000 16.06 23.29 198
Denmark 0.241 0.220 0.000 0.000 48.63 68.00 1,106
Spain 0.307 0.522 0.000 0.000 32.23 44.85 531
Finland 0.293 0.717 0.000 0.002 71.65 88.65 2,379
France 0.207 0.524 0.000 0.000 28.05 40.29 435
Greece 0.210 0.983 0.000 0.000 61.18 76.84 1,648
Ireland 0.311 0.583 0.000 0.003 45.74 56.95 957
Italy 0.246 0.592 0.000 0.000 23.50 33.24 344
Japan 0.283 0.538 0.000 0.000 20.45 29.33 295
Korea 0.287 0.668 0.000 0.000 37.29 52.82 769
Luxembourg 0.156 0.834 0.000 0.000 19.40 29.19 320
Netherlands 0.236 0.779 0.000 0.003 52.96 63.02 1,279
Norway 0.218 0.646 0.000 0.000 52.76 65.79 1,211
Portugal 0.260 0.946 0.000 0.269 43.28 59.18 975
Sweden 0.249 0.364 0.000 0.000 43.95 63.29 1,010
United Kingdom 0.292 0.826 0.000 0.000 26.44 36.62 407
USA 0.341 0.625 0.000 0.000 10.06 15.20 111
R5
H-statistic
Lerner index
Herfindahl-
Hirschman 
index
R3
 
Source: BankScope (Bureau Van Dijk) and own elaboration. 
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Table 6. Definition and source of variables 
 DESCRIPTION AND SOURCE 
Growth Average annual real growth rate of value added in a particular sector in each country 
over the period 1993-2003. Source: The 60-Industry Database (classified on the 
basis of ISIC rev. 3) of the  Groningen Growth and Development Centre.  
Share in value added The value added of each sector expressed as a percentage of the total value added in 
the initial year (1993). Source: Groningen Growth and Development Centre. 
Financial dependence Financial dependence is proxied by the ratio of long term debt and short term debt 
distinct from creditors to working capital. Source: Amadeus (Bureau Van Dijk).  
Financial development 
- Credit/GDP 
Credit is taken from the database International Financial Statistics of the 
International Monetary Fund. GDP comes from National Accounts (OECD). 
- Market capitalisation /GDP Stock market capitalization is taken from World Development Indicators (United 
Nations).  
- Total capitalisation /GDP Sum of the credit and stock market capitalization variables.  
Banking competition 
- Lerner index 
 
The Lerner index of market power is calculated by estimating average prices of 
banking activity (as the ratio of total revenue to total assets) and marginal costs 
(specifying a translog costs function). The value of the index is calculated for each 
bank in each year of the sample (1993-2003), using the mean weighted according to 
assets, in the explanatory equation of the economic growth of the individual values. 
The source of information is BankScope. 
- H-statistic The H-statistic is estimated from a revenue function for each country in the period 
1993-2003. The source of information is BankScope. 
- Market concentration Market concentration is proxied by 3 indicators: R3 and  R5 (market share of the 3 
or 5 largest banks), and by the Herfindahl index (squared sum of the market shares 
of all the banks in each country available in BankScope). The means for the period 
1993-2003 are calculated from the annual data for each country. The source of 
information is BankScope.  
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Table 7. Descriptive statistics of the sample used 
 
Mean Standard deviation Median Maximum Minimum
25th 
percentile
75th 
percentile
Growth. 1993-2003 (%) 4.92 10.62 2.65 74.45 -17.86 0.67 5.33
Financial dependence 0.45 0.17 0.43 1.31 0.16 0.36 0.52
Share in value added 1.85 2.25 0.93 13.78 0.00 0.37 2.60
Private credit/GDP (%) 105.22 24.90 102.34 148.45 63.43 85.14 128.91
Market capitalisation/GDP (%) 73.16 37.71 62.32 161.60 15.80 41.91 96.51
Total capitalisation/GDP (%) 178.39 42.65 170.55 275.38 102.74 154.24 201.25
R3 (%) 39.29 15.88 43.28 71.65 10.06 26.44 50.46
R3-1993 (%) 44.16 20.06 40.77 83.89 10.09 27.19 60.37
R5 (%) 52.59 19.25 56.95 88.65 15.20 36.62 65.79
R5-1993 (%) 57.75 22.15 60.46 88.26 15.52 38.00 76.28
Herfindahl index 910 603 957 2379 111 407 1211
Herfindahl index-1993 1208 1215 917 6039 107 456 1470
H-statistic 0.65 0.17 0.64 0.98 0.22 0.58 0.77
H-statistic: 1993-1997 0.71 0.16 0.72 0.99 0.45 0.58 0.84
Lerner index 0.25 0.04 0.25 0.34 0.16 0.22 0.29
Lerner index-1993 0.23 0.07 0.22 0.39 0.10 0.16 0.29
 
 
Source: Amadeus (Bureau Van Dijk), BankScope (Buerau Van Dijk), OECD, United Nations, 
Internacional Monetary Fund, Groninghen Growth Development Centre and own elaboration. 
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Table 8. Correlation matrix 
 
 
Growth. 
1993-03
Financial 
dependence
Share in 
value 
added. 1993
Credit 
/GDP
Market 
capitalisation/
GDP
R3 R3. 1993 R5 R5. 1993 Herfindahl index
Herfindahl 
index. 1993 H-statistic
H-statistic. 
1993-98
Lerner 
index
Growth. 1993-03
Financial dependence -0.194
(0.000)
Share in value added. 1993 -0.139 0.018
(0.000) (0.561)
Credit /GDP -0.059 -0.001 0.000
(0.061) (0.965) (0.996)
Market capitalisation/GDP -0.009 -0.001 0.017 -0.119
(0.766) (0.980) (0.592) (0.000)
R3 0.048 0.004 -0.011 -0.284 -0.108
(0.128) (0.892) (0.735) (0.000) (0.001)
R3. 1993 0.073 0.004 -0.011 -0.337 -0.057 0.887
(0.022) (0.898) (0.735) (0.000) (0.070) (0.000)
R5 0.050 0.005 -0.010 -0.265 -0.126 0.990 0.880
(0.118) (0.881) (0.764) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
R5. 1993 0.070 0.003 -0.011 -0.280 -0.079 0.933 0.971 0.940
(0.028) (0.916) (0.732) (0.000) (0.013) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Herfindahl index 0.046 0.009 -0.006 -0.379 0.019 0.943 0.864 0.939 0.870
(0.150) (0.775) (0.852) (0.000) (0.550) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Herfindahl index. 1993 0.056 0.012 -0.001 -0.353 0.043 0.631 0.808 0.651 0.706 0.782
(0.077) (0.715) (0.966) (0.000) (0.176) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
H-statistic 0.003 -0.004 -0.003 -0.156 0.197 0.144 0.074 0.086 0.009 0.145 -0.004
(0.917) (0.897) (0.919) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.020) (0.006) (0.771) (0.000) (0.909)
H-statistic. 1993-98 0.021 -0.016 0.004 0.106 0.105 -0.033 0.055 -0.064 0.003 -0.120 -0.113 0.506
(0.515) (0.614) (0.908) (0.001) (0.001) (0.296) (0.081) (0.042) (0.925) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Lerner index 0.023 -0.002 -0.013 -0.262 0.144 -0.094 0.073 -0.112 0.026 -0.046 0.036 -0.173 0.032
(0.468) (0.938) (0.675) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.021) (0.000) (0.421) (0.145) (0.256) (0.000) (0.309)
Lerner index. 1993 0.028 -0.005 -0.012 -0.155 -0.099 -0.319 -0.234 -0.339 -0.224 -0.396 -0.385 -0.097 -0.050 0.609
(0.375) (0.878) (0.708) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.117) (0.000)  
 
Source: Amadeus (Bureau Van Dijk), BankScope (Buerau Van Dijk), OECD, United Nations, International Monetary Fund, Groninghen Growth Development Centre and 
own elaboration. p-values in brackets. 
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Table 9. Economic growth and financial development 
 
Constant 0.0126 -0.0015 -0.0201
(0.0151) (0.0167) (0.0193)
Share in value added. 1993 -0.0905 -0.0843 -0.0954
(0.1356) (0.1352) (0.1350)
Financial dependence*Credit/GDP 0.0005 *
(0.0003)
Financial dependence*Market capitalisation/GDP 0.0006 **
(0.0002)
Financial dependence*Total capitalisation/GDP 0.0006 ***
(0.0002)
R2 adj. 0.8222 0.8229 0.8236
Number of observations 995 995 995
Differential in real growth rate 0.40 0.53 0.49
(1) (2) (3)
 
  
Notes: The dependent variable is the annual growth rate in real value form the period 1993-03 for each 
sector in each country. Definitions and data sources are in Table 7. The differential in real growth rate 
measures (in percentage terms) how much faster a sector at the 75th percentile level of financial 
dependence grows with respect to a sector at the 25th percentile level when is located in a country at the 
75th percentage of financial development rather than in one at 25th percentile. All regressions include both 
country and sector fixed effects (not reported). Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. * 
Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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Table 10. Economic growth, financial development and bank competition 
Constant -0.0172 -0.0184 -0.0166 0.0150 -0.0180
(0.0196) (0.0197) (0.0194) (0.0215) (0.0310)
-0.0955 -0.0955 -0.0977 -0.0975 -0.0957
(0.1350) (0.1351) (0.1349) (0.1341) (0.1351)
0.0006 *** 0.0006 *** 0.0006 *** 0.0007 *** 0.0006 ***
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
-0.0414
(0.0535)
-0.0178
(0.0442)
-0.2382 *
(0.1385)
-0.1684 ***
(0.0470)
-0.0166
(0.1952)
R2 adj. 0.8236 0.8235 0.8240 0.8259 0.8235
Number of observations 995 995 995 995 995
Differential in real growth rate
Financial development 0.46 0.48 0.45 0.51 0.49
Bank competition -0.16 -0.09 -0.32 -0.53 -0.02
(5)(4)(1) (2) (3)
Share in value added. 1993
Financial dependence*Total capitalisation/GDP
Financial dependence*R3
Financial dependence*R5
Financial dependence*H-statistic
Financial dependence*Herfindahl index
Financial dependence*Lerner index
 
 
Notes: The dependent variable is the annual growth rate in real value form the period 1993-03 for each sector in each country. Definitions and data sources are in Table 7. The 
differential in real growth rate measures (in percentage terms) how much faster a sector at the 75th percentile level of financial dependence grows with respect to a sector at the 
25th percentile level when is located in a country at the 75th percentage of financial development (bank competition) rather than in one at 25th percentile. All regressions 
include both country and sector fixed effects (not reported). Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 
1%. 
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Table 11. Economic growth, initial financial development and bank competition 
 
(4) (5)
Constant -0.0079 -0.0120 -0.0079 0.0104 -0.0544
(0.0168) (0.0173) (0.0168) (0.0203) (0.0238)
-0.1017 -0.0980 -0.1017 -0.0952 -0.0995
(0.1345) (0.1349) (0.1346) (0.1346) (0.1344)
0.0006 *** 0.0007 *** 0.0006 *** 0.0008 *** 0.0008 ***
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0021) (0.0002) (0.0002)
-0.1540 **
(0.0698)
-0.0057
(0.0390)
-0.1545 **
(0.0698)
-0.1055 **
(0.0524)
0.2789 **
(0.1142)
R2 adj. 0.8248 0.8238 0.8248 0.8246 0.8250
Number of observations 995 995 995 995 995
Differential in real growth rate
Financial development 0.50 0.59 0.50 0.67 0.67
Bank competition -0.85 -0.04 -0.26 -0.46 0.62
Financial dependence*Total capitalisation/GDP 1993
Financial dependence*R3 1993
Financial dependence*R5 1993
(1)
Share in value added. 1993
(3)
Financial dependence*H-statistic 1993-98
Financial dependence*Herfindahl index 1993
Financial dependence*Lerner index 1993
(2)
 
 
Notes: The dependent variable is the annual growth rate in real value form the period 1993-03 for each sector in each country. Definitions and data sources are in Table 7. The 
differential in real growth rate measures (in percentage terms) how much faster a sector at the 75th percentile level of financial dependence grows with respect to a sector at the 
25th percentile level when is located in a country at the 75th percentage of financial development (bank competition) rather than in one at 25th percentile. All regressions 
include both country and sector fixed effects (not reported). Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 
1%. 
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Table 12. Economic growth, initial financial development and bank competition: manufacturing sector 
 
(4) (5)
Constant -0.0470 -0.0606 -0.0461 -0.0272 -0.1342
(0.0334) (0.0336) (0.0313) (0.0395) (0.0438)
0.4952 0.4900 0.4834 0.4911 0.4775
(0.4332) (0.4337) (0.4316) (0.4328) (0.4311)
0.0007 ** 0.0008 *** 0.0006 ** 0.0008 *** 0.0009 **
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0030) (0.0003) (0.1610)
-0.0606
(0.0627)
0.0027
(0.0560)
-0.1998 **
(0.0965)
-0.0995 *
(0.0759)
0.3797 **
(0.1610)
R2 adj. 0.8522 0.8519 0.8533 0.8525 0.8530
Number of observations 535 535 535 535 535
Differential in real growth rate
Financial development 0.69 0.79 0.59 0.79 0.89
Bank competition -0.39 0.02 -0.40 -0.52 1.00
(3)(1) (2)
Financial dependence*R3 1993
Financial dependence*Total capitalisation/GDP 1993
Financial dependence*R3 1993
Financial dependence*H-statistic 1993-98
Financial dependence*Lerner index 1993
Financial dependence*R5 1993
Financial dependence*Herfindahl index 1993
 
 
Notes: The dependent variable is the annual growth rate in real value form the period 1993-03 for each sector in each country. Definitions and data sources are in Table 7. The 
differential in real growth rate measures (in percentage terms) how much faster a sector at the 75th percentile level of financial dependence grows with respect to a sector at the 
25th percentile level when is located in a country at the 75th percentage of financial development (bank competition) rather than in one at 25th percentile. All regressions 
include both country and sector fixed effects (not reported). Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 
1%. 
 
 
 
 
